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ABSTRACT

CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTEMPORARY GAG ORDER REQUESTS IN MEDIA
LAW REPORTER VOLUMES 19 THROUGH 33

BRAD L. CLARK
Department of Communications
Master of Arts

The conflict between the First Amendment and the Sixth Amendment is not new
nor is it easily decipherable. Both amendments appear to have absolute priority, yet they
appear to conflict (Erickson, 1977). The First Amendment declares unequivocally,
“Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press[,]” while
the Sixth Amendment states with equal force, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed...” (U.S. Constitution, Amendment I,
Amendment VI). Free speech and an unrestricted press can lead to a partial jury, but a
jury unbiased by the media may mean restricted speech. In the judicial system the debate

about how to balance these two competing constitutional rights has raged for decades, but
one critical area—the nature and characteristics of requests for judicial “gag” orders—has
been largely ignored.
This thesis analyzed 103 cases from the Media Law Reporter volumes 19 through
33 (approximately 1991-2005) where gag orders were requested because of pretrial
publicity. Those 103 cases were evaluated for the type of case, the reason for the case,
when the gag order was requested, who requested the gag order, why they requested the
gag order, who opposed the gag order, why they opposed the gag order, and why the gag
order was granted or denied.
It was found that although the issue of gag orders and their use in trials is not
settled there is a general pattern to how they tend to be used. This study found that gag
orders are most commonly used by judges in serious criminal trials, particularly at the
federal level. Further, these cases usually involved juries, and the targets of the gag order
were the parties involved in the trial, not the press.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTEMPORARY GAG ORDER REQUESTS IN MEDIA
LAW REPORTER VOLUMES 19 THROUGH 33

CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

The conflict between the First Amendment and the Sixth Amendment is not new
nor is it easily decipherable. Both amendments appear to have absolute priority, yet they
appear to conflict (Erickson, 1977). The First Amendment declares unequivocally,
“Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press[,]” while
the Sixth Amendment states with equal force, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed...” (U.S. Constitution, Amendment I,
Amendment VI). Free speech and an unrestricted press can lead to a partial jury, but a
jury unbiased by the media may mean restricted speech. In the judicial system the debate
about how to balance these two competing constitutional rights has raged for decades, but
one critical area—the nature and characteristics of requests for judicial “gag” orders—has
been largely ignored in academic literature.
Although the nature of gag orders is largely unexplored, scholars have debated at
length the constitutional priority assigned to them (Carter & Clark, 2006; Chance, 1996;
Todd, 1990). Some scholars have tried to argue for something of a neutral ground,
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conceding that gag orders on the press are inherently unconstitutional, but that gag orders
on trial participants are acceptable. They argue that there is an important difference
between restraining the media and restraining trial participants, and that although it is
unconstitutional to gag the media it is still legal to gag trial participants (Swartz, 1990;
Stabile, 1990). In a similar vein Carter and Clark (2006) indicated that courts are much
more likely to protect the speech interests of the press than of the trial participants
themselves.
There is support for this idea in the dicta given by the Supreme Court in Sheppard
v. Maxwell (Stabile, 1990; Gentile, 1992). Stabile (1990) explained the reasoning behind
this by noting that with a gag order on trial participants, the media are still free to publish
any information they obtain and First Amendment rights are still protected. Further,
Stabile (1990) noted that lawyers and court personnel have a “fiduciary responsibility not
to make public disclosures that are likely to result in prejudice or an unfair trial” (p. 346).
Also the rights of the media are to observe the proceedings of the court and report them,
so as to safeguard against unethical behavior, but there is no inherent right to have access
to the trial participants themselves. This is because the media does not hold a special
right of access to criminal trials above the rights of the general public (Stabile, 1990).
Distinctions have also been made by some of the courts regarding the standard
required for a gag order to overcome the presumption against their constitutionality
(Carter & Clark, 2006). When a gag order is imposed on trial participants and the
participants challenge the order, the “clear and present danger” standard is generally
applied, making the gag orders’ rejection more likely. If, on the other hand, the media
challenge a gag order that has been imposed on trial participants, the lower reasonable
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likelihood standard tends to be applied (Stabile, 1990). The reasoning for this is that “a
gag order constitutes a prior restraint when challenged by the silenced individual, but not
when challenged by a third party” (Todd, 1990, p. 1177).
On the other side of the debate Stabile (1990) noted, “If the press were restricted
from publishing the information that it obtains about a criminal proceeding, the public's
ability to scrutinize the criminal justice system would be severely hampered” (p. 342).
This is certainly true, especially if the restrictions are systematic, but even if the
restrictions are limited to only a few cases, transparency would still be necessary to
assure ethical and just proceedings. Sokol (1998) noted that “people simply perform
better when their performance is being, or may be, observed” (p. 918). This idea is
further explained by Chemerinsky (1998) who indicated that media exposure is likely to
lead to fairer trials because judges know that the impartiality of their actions is being
scrutinized by the country. Further, open trials educate the public about the judicial
process, facilitate fact finding, and help insulate the court against claims of injustice
(Sokol, 1998).
This study contributes to this scholarly conversation by carefully examining and
describing the characteristics of gag order requests and judicial responses, something that
researchers generally have avoided. The study compares the respective defining features
of granted and rejected gag order requests. The study first provides a background
description of three key U.S. Supreme Court precedents on gag orders. In chapter three,
the study provides a literature review of issues surrounding gag orders. Chapter four
presents the method employed to analyze gag order opinions that serve as a basis for the
findings and discussion of this study. Chapter five reports findings based on careful
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examination of 103 gag order cases reported in Media Law Reporter from approximately
1991 to 2005. Chapter six will present a discussion of the findings. In chapter seven, a
discussion of the limitations and suggestions for future studies is provided.
Statement of Purpose
This study seeks to examine the characteristics of gag orders in an attempt to
better understand the ways that they are being used in civil and criminal cases. In order
to do that this study looks at the types of cases for which gag orders are requested, when
they are being requested, who is requesting them, and why they are requesting them. The
study also examines who is opposing the gag orders and why, as well as the reasoning of
the courts for the granting or denying the gag order. By examining these properties this
study hopes to shed light on the types of cases for which gag orders are deemed
acceptable, as well as the reasoning behind why they are being used, despite the
presumption against their constitutionality.
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CHAPTER TWO
Background

Sheppard v. Maxwell
The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that news media coverage can result in a
violation of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy and public trial by
an impartial jury. For example, in Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966), Dr. Sam Sheppard had
been accused of murdering his pregnant wife in a brutal manner (Sheppard, 1966).
Sheppard cooperated with police, and was pressured into multiple interviews by them
with the media present and without counsel (Sheppard, 1966). In fact, during an inquest
held at a local school auditorium with hundreds present, his counsel was forcibly ejected,
to the cheering of the crowd, for trying to submit evidence (Sheppard, 1966).
Pre-trial coverage of the crime included many incorrect and prejudicial reports
concerning the events and Sheppard himself, along with frequent calls for his arrest in the
news media (Sheppard, 1966). Media coverage of the trial was pervasive and extremely
intrusive, even in the courtroom itself. During the trial the courtroom was packed with
reporters whose noise coming and going was so loud that witnesses and counsel could
barely be heard, even with a loudspeaker system installed (Sheppard, 1966). All three
Cleveland newspapers published the names and addresses of all 75 prospective potential
jurors. Because of this all of the prospective jurors received letters and phone calls
regarding the case (Sheppard, 1966).
At the conclusion of the trial Sheppard was found guilty, but the Supreme Court
reversed the decision because of the excessive media coverage and its prejudicial
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influence on the case (Sheppard, 1966). The Supreme Court reversed the decision in
Sheppard based solely on the publicity that surrounded the case (held to be an
infringement of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right) and not on a demonstration of
actual prejudice, which is the traditional rule (Constantini, 1980; Douglas, 1994).
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart
Another watershed case regarding the use of gag orders is Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart (1976). Nebraska (1976) deals with Erwin Simants, who was
accused of murdering six people in the course of a sexual assault. Although the crime
took place in a small Nebraska town, nationwide press coverage occurred almost
immediately and the county attorney, with the defense concurring, requested a gag order
be imposed on the proceedings, including on members of the press (Nebraska, 1976).
The court granted the order with the stipulation that it would be removed once the jury
had been empanelled. The order was to restrict:
(1) the existence or contents of a confession Simants had made to law
enforcement officers, which had been introduced in open court at
arraignment; (2) the fact or nature of statements Simants had made to
other persons; (3) the contents of a note he had written the night of the
crime; (4) certain aspects of the medical testimony at the preliminary
hearing; and (5) the identity of the victims of the alleged sexual assault
and the nature of the assault. It also prohibited reporting the exact nature
of the restrictive order itself. (Nebraska, 1976, p. 543-544)
After the trial was concluded and Simants convicted, the Supreme Court felt the need to
hear the case, despite the apparent mootness. The Supreme Court reversed the gag order,
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indicating that the trial court had not demonstrated that other means of insuring a fair trial
would not have been sufficient, nor that the need for the gag order was strong enough to
overcome the presumption against its constitutionality (Nebraska, 1976).
Regarding the legal use of gag orders, Schmidt (1977) declared that “the media’s
First Amendment interest in access to the news may be balanced against and outweighed
by legitimate state interests” (p. 532). His reasoning is simply that the media are
generally and properly excluded from the meetings of private organizations, from
executive sessions of official bodies, Supreme Court conferences, and grand jury
proceedings, and therefore it can reasonably be assumed that it is just as proper to
exclude the media from attending or publishing information regarding trials, even if it is
not necessary to assure a fair trial (Schmidt, 1977).
In contrast to Schmidt’s open policy on gag orders, Stabile (1990) asserted that in
Nebraska Press the court offered a strict three-part test, which had to be satisfied before
a court could impose a gag order on the media:
The test requires a court to consider: “(a) the nature and extent of pretrial
news coverage; (b) whether other measures would be likely to mitigate the
effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity; and (c) how effectively a
restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened danger.” (p. 342)
Commenting on this three-part test, Garbacz (1992) stated that “[m]any commentators
have concluded that satisfying all three-prongs of Nebraska Press, and thereby justifying
the imposition of a prior restraint, is impossible. Yet the Supreme Court has steadfastly
maintained that courts should not deem prior restraints per se unconstitutional” (p. 3).
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Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada
In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada (1991), Grady Sanders was accused of stealing
money and cocaine that had been stored by the police in a vault owned and operated by
Sanders (Gentile, 1991). Two police officers had unrestricted access to the goods, but
were dismissed as suspects by the police. Leaks in the police department informed the
press that the chief suspect was Sanders and subsequent publicity caused Sanders to go
out of business (Gentile, 1991). In an effort to stem the tide of negative publicity
regarding his client, the defense attorney, Dominic Gentile, for the first time in his career
initiated a press conference (Gentile, 1991). Following the press conference, the State
Bar of Nevada then initiated proceedings against Gentile, claiming he intentionally tried
to prejudice the potential jury pool, which would violate a state bar code of conduct. The
Nevada Supreme Court then disciplined Gentile for his extrajudicial statements, but the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the action, finding that although a court could restrict a
lawyer’s speech if it had a substantial likelihood of prejudicing the pending legal
proceeding, that was not the case here (Gentile, 1991).
Garbacz (1992) stated that “[a]lthough courts did not commonly employ indirect
restraints prior to Nebraska Press, trial judges responded to Nebraska Press’ lesson and
began to use indirect restraints with increasing frequency” (p. 5). Further the author
declared that “[i]f the door to indirect restraints was partially opened by Sheppard,
Nebraska Press marked the official first step through the door. Both the majority and
dissent in Nebraska Press were willing to exclude restrictions on trial participants from
the protection of the prior restraint doctrine” (Garbacz, 1992, p. 5).
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In defending the constitutionality of gag orders, Minnefor (1995) stated that
“...the Supreme Court’s decision in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada should be interpreted
to permit trial courts to impose gag orders on trial participants merely upon a finding that
extrajudicial comments by those participants are reasonably likely to prejudice the
defendant’s right to a fair trial” (p. 101-102). If this is indeed the precedent set in Gentile
then it would seem that gag orders could be commonly implemented. Further, Goldstein
(1993) stated that it is lawful to restrict jurors from speaking to the press and that legal
means exist for enforcing their silence.
Garbacz also noted that “First Amendment rights were not absolute and that a
court could constitutionally maintain a prior restraint on the press only if the ‘gravity of
the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger’” (Garbacz, 1992, p. 3; and Gentile, 1991). Thus, it would
appear that even prior restraints can be constitutionally justified against the media,
although the standard is set very high.
Gag Order Cases in Media Law Reporter Since 1991
Although it may have seemed after Nebraska Press that gag orders would become
a thing of the past, that did not turn out to be the case. Researchers noted almost
immediately that, even though the Nebraska Press decision seemed to signal
constitutional disfavor toward gag orders, trial court judges continued to employ gag
orders in an attempt to control potentially prejudicial pretrial publicity (Gourley, 1978).
It appeared, however, that appellate courts in the immediate aftermath of Nebraska Press
were very likely to reverse gag orders granted by trial courts. In fact, in one study
conducted shortly after Nebraska Press, sixteen of seventeen gag orders granted by trial
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judges in the years immediately following Nebraska Press were reversed on appeal
(Gourley, 1978).
In the wake of such odds following Nebraska Press, proponents of gag orders
seemingly shifted their focus from requesting gag orders directly on the news media to
requesting gag orders instead on trial participants. In Gentile, the U.S. Supreme Court
signaled that gag orders on trial participants, rather than directly on the news media,
could pass constitutional muster under a relatively easy standard—proponents need only
show that a reasonable likelihood of prejudicial pretrial publicity exists.
Given that gag orders continue to be requested and granted in hopes of thwarting
prejudicial pretrial publicity, it is important to understand the nature and characteristics of
gag orders. Specifically, it is important to understand if the courts are following the U.S.
Supreme Court, by presuming gag orders against the media as unconstitutional, while at
the same time allowing gag orders against the trial participants with only a reasonable
showing of prejudicial pretrial publicity.
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine the characteristics of gag order
requests following Gentile. The study located and examined one hundred and three gag
order case reports in the Media Law Reporter from 1991 to 2005. As will be discussed,
the one hundred and three cases were examined to determine the characteristics of the
cases, including the type of case, the reason for the case, when the gag order was
requested, who requested the gag order, why they requested the gag order, who opposed
the gag order, why they opposed the gag order, and why the gag order was granted or
denied. Basic information about each of the 103 cases studied is summarized in
Appendix 2.
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CHAPTER THREE
Literature Review

News Media Coverage and Case Outcome
Whether trial publicity affects the outcome of trials is up for debate, but this does
not stop lawyers from claiming negative effects against their clients. Minow (1991)
found that in the 1980s more than 3,100 claims were made in national newspapers and
wire services that a lawyer’s client could not receive a fair trial because of trial publicity.
In fact, media effects have been an issue surrounding court cases since United States v.
Reid in 1851, when two jurors, who were accused of being biased by a newspaper article,
swore in court that it had not influenced them in regards to the defendant’s guilt or
innocence (53 U.S. 361).
The importance of understanding whether the publicity surrounding a trial affects
its outcome cannot be overstated because if it does then to some degree justice is being
held at the mercy of the press. Never has this been more likely to be true than now
because an increasing number of cases garner media attention and the press is more
intrusive in the courtroom than ever before (Minnefor, 1995).
A vast body of research in the fields of law, communications, and psychology has
been devoted to understanding whether media coverage does in fact influence trial
outcomes. Most of this research centers around whether jurors are influenced by the
publicity surrounding a case and become more prone to convict the defendant. A review
of these articles demonstrates that there is disagreement among scholars as to the effects
of media coverage. Some seem to feel that the results of publicity are significant and
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should be carefully considered during trials. Others indicate that the media might have
an impact, but that it is minimal at best. Lastly, some scholars indicate that the media has
no influence at all on trial outcomes.
Regarding the effects of trial publicity, Greene and Wade (1988) found that 75%
of mock jurors exposed to publicity thought the defendant was guilty, compared to only
60% of those not exposed to the publicity. A study by Ogloff (1994) found that after
intense media coverage regarding child abuse and sexual abuse that was said to have
occurred in a Christian Orphanage, 95% of the community believed the accused men
were guilty. This is despite the fact that the accused were men who had previously been
trusted and respected by members of the public. Padawer-Singer and Barton (1975)
found that 78% of those exposed to publicity in the form of a newspaper article believed
the defendant to be guilty, compared to only 45% of the control group. These scholars
are not alone in their findings. Indeed, many other researchers have also found that
people are in fact influenced by publicity and become more likely to convict (Devine,
2001; Garry & Riordan, 1977; Hope, 2004; Imrich, 1995, Sak, 1997; Studebaker, 1997;
Trial: Influences on the jury, 2003).
A large number of studies have found that there is a positive correlation between
the amount of knowledge that people have about a case and the likelihood that they think
the defendant is guilty (Constantini & King, 1980; Hope, Memon & McGeorge, 2004;
Studebaker & Penrod, 1997; Wright & Ross 1997; Wright, 1997). Further, Wright
(1997) found there was a correlation between newspaper reading and knowledge of the
case. Similarly, Studebaker and Penrod (1997) discovered that the more media sources a
person uses the more they will know and thus the more likely they are to convict. Wright
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(1997) also found that people who read the newspaper or watched TV were more likely
to perceive a defendant as guilty. Interestingly, even juror exposure to crime news in
general has been found to increase the likelihood that a defendant will be convicted
(Bruschke, 1999). Testing whether different types of media induce bias to different
degrees, Ogloff and Vidmar (1994) found that subjects were more likely to think that the
defendants were guilty after reading articles about criminal cases, even more likely after
watching a video about criminal cases, and even more likely if exposed to both.
An important area of a potential juror’s knowledge is information or evidence that
would be considered inadmissible in court. It has been shown that reports of prior
convictions, especially of similar crimes, are particularly damaging for defendants (Otto,
1994; Saks, 1997). Otto found that the area of publicity that had the greatest impact on
the final outcome of the trial was regarding the defendant’s character (Otto 1994). This is
particularly noteworthy in light of the fact that evidentiary rules generally preclude
introduction of evidence of prior crimes or bad character, except in some limited
instances.
Another indirect way that publicity can affect the outcome of a trial is through its
impact on witnesses. Witnesses are often a large part of both the defense’s and
prosecution’s case, yet publicity can affect their testimony and its impact. To begin with,
the demeanor of a witness is often affected by the stress of testifying in a highly
publicized trial. This can be because of concerns regarding personal safety or hounding
by the media and others (Breheny, 1995). Further a witness may be too intimidated to
testify because of the media attention (Breheny, 1995). Lastly, if a witness has been paid
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by the media to tell their story to the press, the jurors may consider their testimony
tainted or improperly motivated and discount what they say.
Just as different types of media have been shown to have varying degrees of
impact on jurors, so does the way the publicity is presented. A study by Studebaker
(1997) found that pre-trial publicity did impact juror’s perceptions of guilt, both before
and after a trial, but that publicity that was emotional in nature, such as regarding
particularly heinous crimes, had the most impact.
However, support for the prejudicial effect of media coverage is not universally
found or agreed upon. Some research has not found the media to be influential upon trial
outcomes or has found that its effects are complex and varied. For example, in a study of
federal murder cases from 1993-1995, Bruschke (1999) found that murder defendants
whose cases received high amounts of publicity and those whose cases received no
publicity were convicted at about the same rate (82% and 79% respectively). The
surprise was that the conviction rate for federal murder trials receiving low amounts of
publicity was 92%.
Another example of the complex nature of the publicity riddle is a study by
Greene (1988), which found the type of publicity to which the jurors were exposed was
highly relevant to how it might influence them. The results indicated that when subjects
were exposed to publicity about a man convicted for a crime he did not commit, they
were less likely to find the defendant guilty than those who were exposed to no publicity
(40% and 60% respectively). He also found that jurors could be swayed for or against
the defendant by exposure to positive or negative news stories about similar cases and
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that even exposure to news articles about dissimilar cases still had an effect (Greene,
1988).
Further muddying the water, some scholars claim that the studies that do show
media effects are not valid in the real world, arguing that they have methodological and
external validity problems that are significant enough to make them meaningless
(Bruschke, 1999). Perhaps the most vocal of these are Bruschke and Loges (2004), who
indicated there is no basis in communication research for purported publicity effects and
that if publicity does bias trial outcomes it is highly overstated by current research. They
base this claim on a variety of research and reasoning. To begin with, studies divide their
subjects up into groups based on whether they were exposed to negative publicity or not,
but in the real world potential jurors are exposed to varying degrees because they use
different mediums and consume different content. Further, those jurors exposed to the
media are forced to come to a conclusion in concert with jurors not exposed to the media.
One of Bruschke’s (1999) most convincing points is that one of his studies
showed that there is some evidence indicating that pretrial publicity in real cases may
actually increase the chance of acquittal. Despite this, a study by Bruschke (1999) found
that in trials receiving no pretrial publicity defendants were given shorter sentence
lengths than those with any pretrial publicity. In fact, even one story was enough to
significantly increase the sentence length.
Regarding the validity of other studies, Bruschke and Loges (2004) noted that
many experiments try to make the defendant’s guilt ambiguous, having a goal of a fiftyfifty distribution of convictions and acquittals with the control group. This is done in an
attempt to avoid ceiling effects, which would be highly likely in an experiment where
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guilt or innocence appears very clear. The problem is that this is unrealistic because
actual conviction rates are about 80% (Bruschke & Loges, 2004).
Instead, Bruschke and Loges (2004) indicated that the largest effect on trial
outcome is economic. Their research shows that the wealthier a person is, the less time
he or she will have to serve and the more likely it is that he or she will be acquitted.
Another important, albeit obvious, effect on trial outcomes is the actual evidence in the
case. Saks (1997) found that when jurors are exposed to plentiful trial evidence, pretrial
publicity and biases are greatly diluted.
In a novel argument, Strauss (1996) declared that the best argument against
publicity impacting a trial is that society trusts judges to make decisions based solely on
courtroom evidence every day, despite being exposed to outside publicity. Further,
judges are never sequestered or instructed to refrain from viewing television or reading
newspapers. Strauss argued that legal training is in no way designed to make a judge
immune to media effects or to outside pressure. Thus she declares that if judges are
sufficiently unaffected, so jurors must be also.
Unfortunately, this argument actually proves little, except that the system is
inconsistent. It does not, as Strauss claimed, necessarily lead to a conclusion that jurors
are not influenced by the media. In fact, using the same logic one could argue that since
jurors are treated by the justice system as being influenced by the media, that means
judges must also be influenced and the system should take measures to shield judges
from being impacted by publicity.
Other scholars argue that the impact of the publicity surrounding a trial is
irrelevant or even beneficial because in early U.S. courts knowledge concerning a case
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was considered a prerequisite to jury service, instead of a detriment (Minow, 1991). In
fact, Minow (1991) argued that the current pursuit of a jury ignorant of the facts of a trial
destroys the judicial system because the search for unbiased jurors becomes a search for
the uninformed and unintelligent.
In a similar plea that informed jurors not be excluded from the judicial process,
Strauss (1996) argued that in early U.S. courts jurors were selected because they knew
the defendants and were thus deemed most capable of determining the truth of the
accusations against them and evaluating the credibility of their testimony. Strauss (1996)
also noted that by placing a premium on ignorance to the facts, the court is placing a
premium on jurors who are ignorant in general.
Surprisingly, analysis of past studies demonstrates that students, who are the most
common subjects used for research, are less likely to convict than a more representative
group (Bornstein, 1999; Steblay, 1999). Thus, the current body of research may actually
understate the effects and impact of publicity because it is based upon groups that are
inherently less likely to convict. Steblay also found that the experimental studies that
found the strongest effects were also the most realistic (Steblay, 1999).
Despite claims by some that existing research is invalid or too inaccurate to
demonstrate a prejudicial effect by the media, when the body of research is taken as a
whole it does seem to indicate that there is a biasing effect by the media. For example,
Bornstein (1999), who analyzed 20 years worth of articles about juries in the journal Law
and Human Behavior, found that although most studies were not very realistic, their
results differed very little from those studies that were considered more realistic. This
means that the results of surveys and a wide variety of experiments, which nearly always

Gag Order Requests

18

found that the media does affect juries, should be considered accurate. Similarly, after
analyzing forty-four studies, Steblay, Besirevic, Fulero, and Jimenez-Lorente (1999)
declared, “The data support the hypothesis that negative pretrial publicity significantly
affects jurors’ decisions about the culpability of the defendant” (p. 229). After analyzing
the journal Communication Law and Policy from 1996-2004, Reinard and Ortiz (2005)
came to the same conclusion and indicated that most research demonstrates that publicity
influences jurors and their decisions. After conducting a meta-analysis Studebaker
(2000) came to the conclusion that laboratory studies may actually underestimate
publicity effects.
The convergence of so many different studies, each finding similar results,
demonstrates that it is highly likely that publicity does in fact influence trial outcomes.
Thus, it is imperative to take a deeper look at how the media impacts trials and what can
be done about it. This study tackles only a small piece of that examination by looking at
the characteristics of judicial responses to gag order requests. Although this will not
uncover anything about the effectiveness of gag orders or the impact of the media on a
trial, it does demonstrate how judges are using gag orders in their courtrooms.
Methods of Countering Pretrial Publicity
From the preceding it would appear that publicity has an impact on trial outcomes
and is therefore worthy of consideration regarding its impact on the fairness of the trial.
Judges generally seem to act as though publicity does have an impact on trial outcomes
and use a variety of measures in an attempt to mitigate the effects of publicity. These
include jury deliberations, voir dire, jury instructions, delay, sequestration, change of
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venue, change of venire, and gag orders, all of which were outlined by the Supreme Court
in Sheppard (1966) and Nebraska Press (1976).
Jury deliberations are a method built into our judicial system. They occur in
every jury trial and are considered essential to a fair outcome. Deliberations allow for
jurors to discuss evidence and various aspects of the case, so that they can come to a
decision together about the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The assumption is that
by working as a group the bias or prejudice of any single individual will be overridden by
the group.
Stehlin (2005) stated that “Voir dire is the primary and preferred remedy for
pretrial publicity” (p. 307). Voir dire consists of questioning the prospective jurors by the
judge and counsel in order to root out biased jurors. Sometimes it can be very extensive
and privately held in the judge's chambers, but this is rare. Instead it is more frequently
brief and the questioning occurs in front of other potential jurors and the public in open
court.
Judicial instructions for the jury are nearly always, if not always, used in jury
trials. They can vary from simple to complex and are totally under the judge’s control.
Thus, a judge can tailor his jury instructions to suit the context of a particular trial.
Generally, such instructions include an exhortation to ignore information garnered from
the media and to instead rely solely on the information presented at the trial. Frequently
the judge will also instruct the jurors to avoid watching television news programs and
reading the newspaper in order to avoid further sources of potential bias.
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Postponing the trial until the media frenzy surrounding it has died down is another
potential tool at the judge’s disposal. Although used infrequently some claim it is a
useful method of providing the defense with a fair trial.
A less common, but well known, method is sequestration. This occurs only in
trials where media publicity regarding the case is pervasive. Sequestration occurs after
the jury has been selected. The jurors are then taken somewhere to stay for the duration
of the trial where their media access can be restricted and even monitored. Similarly,
outside contact is limited.
Another infrequent, but well known, method is change of venue. When media
attention in a certain area is overwhelming, the case can be tried in another area where
the case will be less known. This has been used in cases such as the 1995 Oklahoma City
federal building bombing, where the local community was perceived to be highly
inflamed against the defendant, and despite high levels of national coverage, other
communities were less prejudiced toward the defendant. Thus Timothy McVeigh’s
prosecution took place in Denver (U.S. v. McVeigh, 1996).
Less well known is the change of venire. This occurs when media coverage is
likely to have biased the local jury pool, but it is still deemed necessary or important to
try the case in the jurisdiction where it occurred. Thus, a jury is brought in from another
community, where the likelihood of their being prejudiced against the defendant is lower.
Lastly, the judge has the authority to issue a gag order. The judicial system
considers this the most extreme and least acceptable method of reducing the impact of the
media (Chance, 1996). If the judge can demonstrate prejudicial publicity against the
defendant, the judge has the capacity to issue a gag order against the press or against the
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participants in the trial. In this way the judge can try to stop inadmissible or prejudicial
information from being propagated in the press and influencing the jurors. Further, if the
information has already been published the judge can try to stop it from being repeated,
decreasing the likelihood of its spread and influence. While stopping the local spread of
rumors may be impossible, stopping the national spread of information regarding the case
could increase the effectiveness of other measures, such as change of venue or change of
venire.
Gag Orders
While each of the methods of attempting to remove the influence of publicity on
trial outcomes has received some study, there have been relatively few studies regarding
the usefulness of gag orders issued by judges in criminal trials. Instead the debate has
almost entirely surrounded the issue of whether the First Amendment trumps the Sixth
Amendment, or vice versa. The debate regarding the use of gag orders, or the free
press/fair trial debate, is a fierce one, both sides vehemently arguing for or against press
restrictions to control media’s coverage of trials. In a way both sides are constitutionally
correct, as the Constitution provides for both a free press and the right to a fair trial, each
essential parts to a just and free society. Choosing one value over the other is extremely
difficult and sorting out the issue based solely on constitutional arguments is not likely to
resolve the question, for although free speech is necessary to insure justice, it also
appears to have the power to destroy the justice it protects.
Instead, it might be important to examine whether gag orders are actually an
effective measure to help insure a fair trial. Doing so would provide an opportunity to
demonstrate either the need for gag orders or their ineffectiveness and thus prove them
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unnecessary. Therefore, an answer to the free press versus fair trial debate may be found
by looking in an entirely different place: Do gag orders actually influence trial outcomes?
Concerning this issue Garry and Riordan (1977) remarked, “[t]he greatest irony of
the fair trial/free press debate is that gag orders are least efficacious in guaranteeing a
trial by impartial jurors in the controversial cases in which gag orders generally are
thought to be most necessary” (p. 579). Many feel similarly, though few studies actually
examine the characteristics of gag orders directly and what studies there are on the topic
disagree (Carter, 2006).
Two of the reasons for which scholars feel that gag orders are ineffective are
timing and the publicity surrounding the gag order itself. Garry and Riordan (1977)
wisely pointed out that “the earliest opportunity to procure such an order may be too late
to shield the jury pool from exposure to press coverage of events relevant to the case or to
the defendant’s character” (p. 577-578). This is certainly true and an important factor to
consider in evaluating the effectiveness of gag orders. Nevertheless, there is a chance
that it might save potential jurors from exposure.
With regard to the publicity surrounding the issue of the gag order itself,
publication of the gag order and the surrounding debate might increase public awareness
of the trial, which could bias potential jurors. On the other hand, even with the increased
publicity, after the gag order has been issued, the resulting publicity will contain less
biasing information and is thus less likely to bias potential jurors.
An important part of understanding gag orders is knowing who is seeking them,
why they are seeking them, and when they are seeking them. By uncovering and
examining this information, it becomes easier to look at the constitutional issues that
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underlay the debate and by extension the acceptability or unacceptability of gag orders.
For example judges may issue gag orders more to protect the judicial processes and
systems from public scrutiny than to protect the rights of a defendant and it is for this
exact reason that prior restraints are to be presumed unconstitutional. Further if gag
orders are sought in the pretrial phases of a case they are more likely to be effective in
shielding potential jurors from prejudicial information, and thus more likely to aid in
providing a fair trial. Only a very limited number of studies have sought to understand
the characteristics of gag orders, which underlie these crucial questions.
Regarding why judges impose gag orders, Chance (1996) declared that “no
published studies examine how, when, and why judges impose restraining orders on the
media or on trial participants” (p. 275). She then conducted a mail survey of Florida
judges in an attempt to answer these questions. Of twenty-one federal court cases found
by a computer search, 43% of gag orders were issued at the request of the presiding
judge, 29% requested by the defense, 19% by both parties, and 10% by the plaintiff or
prosecution (Chance, 1996). Chance also reports that 60% of judges indicated that the
physical safety of trial participants was the “most influential factor” in considering gag
orders, while only 16% indicated that privacy was the biggest factor (Chance, 1996).
Seventy-eight percent of the judges indicated that issuing a gag order was used only as a
last resort (Chance, 1996).
The responses by the judges who participated in the study indicate that 90%
agreed that “news media have a constitutional right to receive information from trials”
(Chance, 1996). Further, 61% of the judges felt gag orders on the media were
presumptively unconstitutional, while 23% said that they were not presumptively
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unconstitutional. In contrast to this, only 35% of judges indicated that restraints on trial
participants were presumptively unconstitutional, while 33% indicated that they were not
(Chance, 1996).
More than half of the judges felt that out-of-court statements regarding the trial
made by trial participants jeopardize a fair trial. Further, more than half of the judges felt
that lawyers were the most likely to make the jeopardizing statements (Chance, 1996).
Similarly 84% of the judges felt that gag orders on the media were more extreme than
gag orders on trial participants, and two-thirds agreed that gag orders on lawyers were
more appropriate than on other trial participants (Chance, 1996).
Based on this same idea of distinction between the different groups involved,
Chance (1996) noted that it appeared that courts which constantly struck down gag orders
saw prior restraints as presumptively unconstitutional, while courts that sometimes
upheld gag orders distinguished between gag orders on the media and gag orders on trial
participants. The results of the study showed that judges tended to make their decisions
regarding gag orders based mainly on their interpretation of the Constitution (Chance,
1996).
From the preceding it becomes apparent that part of understanding who seeks a
gag order and why concerns the target of the gag order. This is because some judges
consider protecting the First Amendment rights of the press as requiring a higher burden
of proof than that necessary for trial participants and in particular lawyers. Thus, it is
important to understand whether the target of the gag orders tend to be the press or the
trial participants.
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A study by Imrich (1995) found that although the press may pass on prejudicial
information before a case, they usually get that information from law enforcement.
Interestingly, once the trial had commenced, the primary source shifted from law
enforcement to the prosecutor (Imrich, 1995). Not surprisingly defense attorneys were
found to be the primary source of information regarding a suspect's innocence (Imrich,
1995). Therefore, it would seem that a gag order on trial participants might be effective
in stemming the flow of prejudicial information, particularly once the proceedings had
begun.
Imrich (1995) also found that nationally reported crime stories were more likely
to contain prejudicial information (31.8%) than locally reported crime stories (23.3%
same city, and 29.1% same state). Further, news stories about homicide were the most
likely stories to contain prejudicial information (32.7%). In an effort to eliminate
prejudicial content some states have adopted voluntary press-bar agreements, but this was
found to have no impact on content and 67% of the stories violated at least one of the
guidelines adopted (Imrich, 1995). Therefore, the type of case and the level of the court
are also important to know because certain types of cases are more likely to face
prejudicial media.
Another detail noted by Imrich (1995), which initially might seem unimportant, is
that first time reports were the most common crime stories and were less likely to contain
prejudicial information (23.1%) than follow-up stories (32.8%). In reality this might
prove to be important, even essential, to the effectiveness of gag orders because it shows
that later stories are more likely to contain prejudicial information. Thus, a gag order
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might be able to be issued early enough to restrict some of the prejudicial information
from getting out.
Therefore it is imperative to understand not just why courts are still issuing gag
orders, despite their being presumed unconstitutional, but also at what stage of the
litigation they are issuing them. It is also important to understand which group is more
likely to pursue the gag order in the first place because if judges are seeking them more
than the defendant, they may be doing so for their own protection and not for the Sixth
Amendment rights of the defendant. Further, it is important to understand what type of
cases are successful in overriding the First Amendment and receiving gag orders because
if they are being granted too broadly it will demonstrate that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
opinions in Nebraska Press and Gentile have not been heeded.
The U.S. Supreme Court has labeled gag orders as presumed to be
unconstitutional. The reason for this is that prior restraints are likely to have a chilling
effect on speech. Those who are under the effects of the gag order may not be sure what
they can say and what they cannot, and therefore they are likely to self-censor more
information than they should (Todd, 1990). Further, in the early 20th century case of
Near v. Minnesota the Court declared three potential exceptions to a total ban on prior
restraints: “first, statements to be made during wartime that would hinder the war effort,
such as publication of troop movements and numbers; second, obscenity; and, third,
statements that would incite violence or revolution” (Carter, 2006, p. 37). Given these
three possibilities it would appear that speech regarding adjudicative matters should
generally not be restrained.
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In studying the constitutionality of gag orders, as already noted, some courts also
distinguish between those imposed on trial participants and those imposed on the press.
While some feel that the former are acceptable, even if the latter are not, many still
believe that no gag orders are constitutional in a courtroom setting and Todd noted that
some cases have found gag orders on parties to effectively be prior restraints on the press
and have struck them down (Todd, 1990).
Along these same lines Chemerinsky (1998) argued that lawyers should not be
subject to gag orders because their speech is in regard to the court, which is therefore
about the government, and political speech is clearly protected by the First Amendment.
Swartz (1990) reminded that “[g]enerally, the government cannot condition privileges
and benefits upon the sacrifice of first amendment rights” (p. 1427). Swartz (1990)
explained the rationale behind this, noting that lawyers are usually considered officers of
the court, while “[d]efendants and witnesses are haled into the court against their wills”
(p.1428). It is this difference, lawyers choosing to be officers of the court and trial
participants being required to speak in court, which is sometimes used to justify gag
orders on lawyers.
Chemerinsky (1998) argued that lawyers should counter any speech against their
client unless the speech is clearly not harmful to their client. This means that lawyers
should feel obligated to respond to leaks by police and prosecutors or other damaging
information and speculation in the media. The reason is that media exposure can lead to
quicker and better settlements, in order to avoid embarrassment (Chemerinsky, 1998).
Further, public discourse about a case can lead to reforms that will benefit society as a
whole (Chemerinsky, 1998).
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CHAPTER FOUR
Methodology

Methodology Overview
As noted by both Chance (1996) and Carter (2006), very few studies have
examined the characteristics of the cases in which gag orders were sought. Most have
instead focused on the effects of pretrial publicity or whether the First or Sixth
Amendment had priority. Therefore the current study looks closely at federal and state
cases where gag orders were requested.
The reason for doing this is that although the U.S. Supreme Court has labeled gag
orders as presumptively unconstitutional, it has not banned them entirely. Thus, in
certain circumstances gag orders are considered appropriate. The current study seeks to
understand what those circumstances are and how gag orders are being used.
To accomplish this, the current study examined cases from the Media Law
Reporter volume 19 through volume 33 (approximately 1991-2005) where gag orders
were requested because of pretrial publicity. The Media Law Reporter is an authoritative
source for cases involving the media and was thus used as the sample from which to
select the cases. Media Law Reporter is published by a private, Washington, D.C.-based
company called Bureau of National Affairs, and it includes verbatim transcripts of
judicial opinions on communications law issues in federal and state courts. Media Law
Reporter may be both less inclusive and more inclusive than judicial opinion databases
such as LexisNexis or Westlaw. It is more inclusive in that it may include opinions,
culled from public court files, that the courts themselves have not chosen to “publish” in
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official court reporting volumes. It is less inclusive in that BNA and Media Law
Reporter rely, in part, on attorneys around the country to voluntary submit, for
consideration to be published, judicial opinions in cases with which those attorneys are
familiar. Media Law Reporter editors then decide what actually gets included in the
service’s weekly updates, which have heretofore been available only in print form, but
(as the study was concluding) have just now been made available online.
The cases used in this study were selected during a previous study on gag orders
by using Media Law Reporter’s classification guide (see Appendix 1) and selecting all of
the pertinent cases from the sections on prior restraints and fair trial, free press (Carter,
2006). The sample period includes 15 volumes of the journal and identified a total of 103
federal and state cases (see Table 1). The starting point of 1991 was selected because
that was when the U.S. Supreme Court gave its opinion regarding gag orders in the
Gentile case. As a landmark case, Gentile presumably altered the way gag orders are
viewed by the lower courts. Cases were analyzed up to 2005 because the study began in
early 2006 and the cases were selected at that time.
All of the state and federal cases in which a gag order was sought, whether it was
granted or not, were entered into a Microsoft Excel database. A range of information
regarding the gag order was then recorded, which included the type of case, the reason
for the case, when the gag order was requested, who requested the gag order, why the gag
order was requested, who opposed the gag order (if anyone), why they opposed the gag
order, and whether the gag order was granted or denied. Further, the judges’ reasoning
for granting or denying the gag orders, if provided, was noted.
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Although Media Law Reporter is recognized as an authoritative source of gag
orders it may represent only a small subset of all the cases for which gag orders were
sought. There are likely other gag order cases out there, but this is believed to be a
representative group that has been selected by a reputable publisher. Thus, although this
study may not be considered exhaustive, it is certainly a study of the opinions thought to
be of most importance by the country’s most prominent publisher of communications law
judicial materials.
Coding for each case was done by reading the case and making note of the
pertinent information in the Excel spreadsheet, such as why the gag order was requested,
who opposed the gag order and why the gag order was granted or denied.
To analyze the data, Excel pivot tables were used. Whether the court granted or
denied the gag order was compared against other variables, such the year of the case, the
type of case, when the gag order was sought, and who sought the gag order.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Findings

The purpose of this study was to gather data on the characteristics of gag orders in
an attempt to better understand the constitutional and other issues behind how and why
they are being used by the courts. The current study analyzed 103 cases from Media Law
Reporter volumes 19 through 33. Those 103 cases were evaluated for the type of case,
the reason for the case, when the gag order was requested, who requested the gag order,
why they requested the gag order, who opposed the gag order, why they opposed the gag
order, and why the gag order was granted or denied.
Of the 103 gag orders that were requested, 33 were allowed and 62 were not.
Thus, gag orders were allowed in 32% of the cases. There were 7 cases that narrowed the
coverage of the gag order or gag orders requested. In the following tables, “not speech
protective” means a judicial decision was given to grant a gag order request or uphold a
gag order on appeal. Meanwhile, in those same tables, “speech protective” means a
judicial decision was given to deny a gag order request or to reverse, on appeal, a gag
order request previously granted by a lower court judge.
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Analysis of Data
Table 1
Gag Orders by Target of Gag Order
Not Speech
Protective

Speech
Protective Both Moot Total

Media

7

33

3

0

43

Parties

24

25

3

1

53

Both

2

4

1

0

7

Total

33

62

7

1

103

In the cases studied the most common group that was the target of the gag order
was the parties involved in the case, such as lawyers, members of the court, witnesses,
jurors, and law enforcement officers. Gag order were requested to be placed on the
parties involved in 53 of the cases and 45% of those gag orders were granted. The only
other target of the gag orders in the cases studied was the media. Gag orders were
requested to be placed on the media in 43 of the cases and 16% of those gag orders were
granted.
This outcome demonstrates that the courts treat the media differently than other
parties, but this should come as no surprise because the U.S. Supreme Court has
instructed the courts to do so. In some ways this disparity between the way the media
and other parties are treated is reassuring because it is an indication that the counsel by
the U.S. Supreme court is being heeded. It shows that gag order requests on the press are
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being held to a higher standard than gag order requests on the parties involved in the
case.
Table 2
Gag Orders by Year
Not Speech
Protective

Speech
Protective Both Moot Total

1991

1

5

0

0

6

1992

1

8

0

0

9

1993

2

3

0

0

5

1994

1

8

1

0

10

1995

4

4

0

0

8

1996

4

3

0

0

7

1997

2

1

1

0

4

1998

2

5

0

0

7

1999

0

2

0

0

2

2000

1

5

2

0

8

2001

3

8

1

1

13

2002

4

4

1

0

9

2003

0

0

0

0

0

2004

8

5

1

0

14

2005

0

1

0

0

1

Total

33

62

7

1

103
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No pattern was found for the years studied, regarding an increase or decrease in
the number of gag orders requested or the likelihood of their success or failure. Of note
is that in only 3 of the 15 years studied were the courts found to restrain speech more
often than they protected it. The first year was 1996, by a 4 to 3 margin, the second year
was 1997, by a 2 to 1 margin, and the third year was 2004, by an 8 to 5 margin.
Table 3
Gag Orders by Criminal or Civil
Not Speech
Protective

Speech
Protective Both Moot Total

Criminal

29

42

5

0

76

Civil

4

19

2

1

26

N/A

0

1

0

0

1

Total

33

62

7

1

103

Of the 103 cased studied, 76 were criminal cases and 26 were civil cases. This
study found that in criminal cases the courts allowed gag orders 38% of the time. In civil
cases gag orders were allowed 15% of the time.
Table 4
Gag Orders by Reason for the Case
Not Speech
Protective
A sitting judge appeared on TV and
commented of pending cases in other

1

Speech
Protective Both Moot Total
0

0

0

1
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jurisdictions
Adults giving liquor to minors and

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

contributing to delinquency
Aggravated assault
Asbestos litigation
Bombing

4

0

0

0

4

Child abuse

1

0

0

0

1

Child molestation

0

0

1

0

1

Class suit against Tobacco Companies

0

1

0

0

1

Defamation

1

1

0

0

2

Desegregation plans for school district

0

1

0

0

1

Divorce

0

2

0

0

2

Drugs

2

1

1

0

4

Embezzlement

0

1

0

0

1

Ex-Governor charged with all sorts of

0

0

1

0

1

Financial

0

1

0

0

1

Gambling

0

1

0

0

1

Guardianship, daughter in proceeding

0

1

0

0

1

7

20

1

0

28

to recover damages for diseases

held in secret meetings

stuff, including witness tampering

to end life support of father
Homicide
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Invasion of Privacy

0

1

0

0

1

Juvenile Court

0

6

0

0

6

Kidnapping

0

1

0

0

1

Lawyers seeking to have revised code

1

0

0

0

1

Litigation between utility companies

0

1

0

0

1

Manslaughter

1

2

0

0

3

N/A

5

7

0

0

12

Photographers photographing jurors

1

0

0

0

1

Police abuse

1

0

0

0

1

Proceeding between Experian (credit

0

1

0

0

1

Prostitution

0

1

0

0

1

Racketeering

2

1

0

0

3

Rape

2

2

0

0

4

Reporter writing about locked out

0

1

0

0

1

Sexual assault

1

3

2

0

6

Shooting

0

1

0

0

1

Suit against petroleum manufacturer

0

1

0

0

1

of ethics struck down because it
infringes on their first amendment
rights

after the trial when told not to

agency) and an Individual

union laborers
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because of leaks, etc
Suit against tobacco companies

0

0

0

1

1

Terrorist attacks (9/11)

1

0

0

0

1

Theft

2

0

0

0

2

Attempted murder

0

0

1

0

1

Total

33

62

7

1

103

The most common reason for a case in which a gag order was sought was
homicide. Of the 103 cases analyzed in the current study, 28 were regarding homicide,
although only 25% of those actually imposed a gag order.
Table 5
Gag Orders by When Requested
Not Speech
Protective

Speech
Protective Both Moot Total

Pre Trial

14

15

2

0

31

Outset of Trial

4

12

3

1

20

During the Trial

1

7

0

0

8

Post Trial

5

2

0

0

7

N/A

9

26

2

0

37

Total

33

62

7

1

103
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Timing of the application for a gag order was also a factor in whether it would be
granted or not. If the order was sought in the pre-trial phases of a case it was granted
45% of the time. The likelihood of a gag order being granted at the outset of the trial or
during the trial was much less likely, at 20% and 13% respectively. If a gag order was
sought after a trial, in anticipation of an appeal or retrial, it was granted 71% of the time.
Table 6
Gag Orders by Who Requested
Not Speech
Protective

Speech
Protective Both Moot Total

Defendant

4

29

4

0

37

Defendant and

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

Judge

26

22

2

1

51

N/A

0

4

0

0

4

Plaintiff

0

2

1

0

3

Prosecutor

1

3

0

0

4

Witnesses

1

0

0

0

1

Total

33

62

7

1

103

Plaintiff
Defendant and
Prosecutor
Judge and
Defendant
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By far the two most common proponents of gag orders were the defendant and the
judge; together they accounted for 88% percent of all the gag orders requested. In fact, in
only 12 of the cases studied was someone other than the defendant or judge named as
seeking a gag order.
Although both defendants and judges sought gag orders with similar frequency
the outcomes between the two parties were quite different. Gag orders were granted 51%
of the time when sought by a judge, but only 11% of the time when sought by a
defendant. It might seem strange that if a judge sought a gag order it was not granted
100% of the time, but the cases studied included appeals to higher courts, which could
reverse the trial judge's gag order and sometimes did, as the numbers indicate.
Table 7
Gag Orders by Why Requested
Not Speech
Protective
Damages associated with being identified

Speech
Protective Both Moot Total

0

1

0

0

1

Defamation and potential for harassment

0

1

0

0

0

Fair trial

18

31

4

0

53

Fair trial and privacy

0

1

0

0

1

Fair trial and protection of jury's privacy

1

0

0

0

1

N/A

1

4

0

1

6

Privacy

0

3

1

0

4

Privacy and protection from further harm

0

1

0

1

as a rape victim
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as victims
Privacy and protection of minors

0

1

0

0

1

Privacy of guards and their safety from

0

1

0

0

1

Privacy of jurors

1

0

0

0

1

Protection from harassment/intimidation

1

0

0

0

1

Protection from irreparable harm

0

1

0

0

1

Protection of minors

2

11

0

0

13

Protection of victim

3

0

0

0

3

Threat to free speech during future

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

Decorum of the court

1

1

0

0

2

Fair trial and protection of minors

1

3

0

0

4

Protection of court and juror privacy,

0

1

1

0

2

1

0

0

0

1

Protecting a witness

0

1

0

0

1

Fair trial and decorum of the court

1

0

0

0

1

Fair trial and juror protection

1

0

0

0

1

Total

33

62

7

1

103

union attacks

deliberations
To protect the jurors from harassment and
thus a mistrial

safety
Fair trial, protection of top secret info,
protection of witnesses
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The most common reason given for requesting a gag order was the desire for a
fair trial. In fact, it was the only reason for seeking a gag order in 51% of the cases. The
next most common single reason given was the protection of minors, which was the only
reason given in 13% of the cases.
Table 8
Gag Orders by Who Opposed
Not Speech

Speech

Protective

Protective

Both

Moot

Total

Appellant

0

0

1

0

1

Defendant

3

3

0

0

6

Defendant and News Media

1

0

0

0

1

Former Defense Attorney

0

1

0

0

1

N/A

6

13

0

0

19

NAACP

0

1

0

0

1

News Media

12

15

3

1

31

News Media and Plaintiff

1

0

0

0

1

Newspaper

5

22

2

0

29

Plaintiff

3

1

0

0

4

TV Station

1

6

1

0

8

Writer

1

0

0

0

1

Total

33

62

7

1

103
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The most common group opposing gag orders was the news media, which in one
form or another opposed the gag orders in 68% of the cases. Specific groups within the
media were often named and by far the most common was newspapers, which were
specifically named as opposing the gag order in 28% of all the cases studied. It is also
interesting to note that in seven of the one hundred and three cases, the defendants
opposed the gag order.
Table 9
Gag Orders by Why Opposed
Not Speech
Protective

Speech
Protective Both Moot Total

First Amendment

13

35

6

1

55

First Amendment

2

9

1

0

12

7

2

0

0

9

1

1

0

0

2

1

0

0

0

1

Irreparable Injury

1

2

0

0

3

N/A

7

11

0

0

18

Overbroad

1

2

0

0

3

Total

33

62

7

1

103

(Implied)
First Amendment
(Newsgathering)
First Amendment
(Watchdog)
Increase Publicity
To Find Witnesses
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In 65% percent of the cases free speech was the reason for opposing a gag order.
The next most common reason given was the right to gather news, which was the stated
reason in 9% of the cases.
Table 10
Gag Orders by Why Granted or Denied
Not Speech
Protective
Did not prove prejudicial media,

Speech
Protective Neither

0

42

0

0

1

0

Easiest and most effective remedy

1

0

0

Free exchange of ideas not threatened

1

0

0

Future prosecution dependent on

1

0

0

Information was legally obtained

0

21

0

Irreparable injury

0

1

0

Moot

0

0

1

None given

0

0

2

No authority on jury speech after trial

0

1

0

Openness

0

5

0

Overbroad

0

11

0

Prior restraints are presumed

0

10

0

need, or other means insufficient
Does not incite to unlawful action
and is thus legal

victim protection

Gag Order Requests

44

Unconstitutional
Prior restraint needed for a fair trial

17

0

0

Protect the decorum of the court

3

0

0

Protection of the jury

2

0

0

Protection of a juvenile

3

0

0

Protection of rape victim

2

0

0

Rebuked parties for arguing cases

0

1

0

Restricting parties, not free speech

11

0

0

Right to gather news

0

2

0

Shining light on corruption

0

2

0

Sides arguing case in the press

2

0

0

Sixth Amendment rights overrule

4

0

0

Temporary restriction

5

0

0

Time and place restriction – content

2

0

0

in the press, instead of gagging them

First Amendment rights

neutral and therefore not a prior restraint

In 43 of the cases the main reason given by the court for not granting a gag order
was a failure to demonstrate the need for it. The next common reason was that the
information had been legally obtained (21 cases).
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In 17 of the cases the main reason given by the court for granting the gag order
was the necessity of the prior restraint for a fair trial. The next most common reason
were that the court was restricting parties and not the press (11 cases).
Table 11
Gag Orders by Type of Court
Not Speech
Protective

Speech
Protective Both Moot Total

State

17

49

5

0

71

Federal

16

13

2

1

32

Total

33

62

7

1

103

Of the 103 cases studied 71 were at the state level and 32 were at the federal level.
Gag orders were granted in 23% of the state cases and 50% of the federal cases.
Table 12
Gag Orders by Trial or Appellate Court
Not Speech
Protective

Speech
Protective Both Moot Total

Trial

18

29

3

0

50

Appellate

15

33

4

1

53

Total

33

62

7

1

103
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Of the cases examined, 50 were regarding trial courts and 53 were regarding
appellate courts. Trial courts granted gag orders 36% of the time and appellate courts
approved gag orders 28%.
Table 13
Gag Orders by Jury or Other
Not Speech
Protective

Speech
Protective Both Moot Total

Advisory Committee

1

0

0

0

1

Judge

0

5

0

0

5

Jury

17

18

5

1

41

Grand Jury

1

0

0

0

1

N/A

14

39

2

0

55

Total

33

62

7

1

103

Only 48% of the cases specified whether they were jury trials or not and of those
41 were jury trials. This study found that in the cases specified as jury trials gag orders
were granted 41% percent of the time. In contrast, of the 5 trials specified as being only
before a judge none of the gag order requests was granted.
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Table 14
Gag Orders by Outcome of Trial
Not Speech
Protective

Speech
Protective Both Moot Total

Convicted

4

3

0

7

Convicted in Part

1

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

Plead Guilty

0

1

0

0

1

N/A

28

57

7

1

93

Total

33

62

7

1

103

Acquitted in Part
Previously Convicted
Waiting for Appeal

Only 10 of the 103 cases studied contained information regarding the actual
outcome of the trial and of those 10 cases, 7 resulted in convictions. Gag orders were
granted in 57% percent of the cases resulting in convictions. I have included this
information, though the very small number of cases means that it is unlikely to be useful
in drawing any conclusions.
Of the 103 cases analyzed, they were five instances of two cases involving the
same defendant. There were two cases concerning John Gotti (19 MLR 1996; 33 MLR
1083). The first occurred in 1992 and the description of the imposed gag order contains
no information regarding the reason for the case. The second occurred in 2004 and was
for racketeering charges. In the 2004 case Gotti requested a gag order on a talk show
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host, whereas the 1992 order was from a judge and forbade lawyers and other involved in
the prosecution of Gotti from talking to the press about certain matters. They were two
separate motions and therefore were treated separately in the study.
The case of U.S. v. Rahman (22 MLR 1063; 22 MLR 1407) was recorded twice in
the study, once in 1993 and once in 1994. Both entries have to do with the same case, but
are regarding different gag order requests. The reason for the case was the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing. Both opinions involved denials of requests from journalists to
vacate a gag order barring disclosure of discovery materials, but the requests were treated
separately in this study because they were made by separate news organizations at
different times in the litigation.
The case concerning In Re Minor Charged (24 MLR 1057; 24 MLR 1064) was
also included twice in the study, both times in 1995. The two motions are regarding the
case of a 13 year old boy accused of homicide. In the first motion the judge rules that the
identity of the boy cannot be disseminated by anyone, including the press. The second
motion occurred one month later, when an appeals court vacated the trial judge's order.
The case U.S. v. Davis (24 MLR 1054; 24 MLR 1083) was recorded twice the
study, both times in 1995. The case concerned New Orleans police officers accused of
various drugs and weapons charges. In 1994 a gag order had been imposed on the parties
involved in the case. Both motions recorded in the study were actions by the media
trying to have the gag order vacated, which were denied both times.
Lastly, the case of State v. Marsh (30 MLR 1505; 30 MLR 1507) was also
recorded twice in the study, both times in 2002. The case was concerned with the
operator of a crematorium, who was found to have more than 100 uncremated bodies on
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the premise. Due to public outrage the court imposed a gag order on the parties involved
in the case and then a few weeks later modified the order.
Both the Gotti cases and the In Re Minor Charged case are in reality different
judges and courts, and thus for the intents and purposes of this study are different cases.
The one case in this study where a gag order was altered at the appellate court was In Re
Minor Charged. Even though it might be considered that the trial court order had no
force and became moot after the appellate court decision, the trial court order was
nonetheless included in the findings because it did illustrate an action by a trial court
judge regarding a gag order that would have been enforced had it not been appealed. It
was felt that there was value in leaving the opinion in the study to demonstrate how
courts, even if later reversed, deal with gag order questions. The other three cases might
be considered duplicates because they are regarding the same case and were handled by
the same judge. Despite this, it was important to include them in the study because they
show the courts at work. In the U.S. v. Rahman and U.S. v. Davis, the court denied both
attempts to have the imposed gag orders removed, but in State v. Marsh, the court was
influenced by the petitions of the media and modified the order to make it more narrowly
tailored and less restrictive.
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CHAPTER SIX
Discussion

Introduction
This study sought to examine the characteristics of gag orders to better understand
how and why they are used. One of the few studies to have ever attempted anything like
this in the past was conducted by Chance (1996), which found that 43% of gag orders
were issued at the request of the judge. The results of the current study were similar,
finding that judges requested the gag orders 50% of the time. In the survey conducted by
Chance (1996) it was found that only 35% of judges felt that gag orders on the trial
participants were acceptable, but the current study found that in actual cases, judges
allowed gag orders on trial participants 45% of the time (or 51% of the time if cases
where the judge allowed portions but not all of the requested gag order are also counted).
Because Chance (1996) was collecting self-report data by means of surveys, it is likely
that judges’ responses may have been influenced by social desirability.
Characteristics of Gag Orders
Probably the most important finding in the study was that gag orders were much
more likely to be imposed on the parties involved in the case than on the press. For
example in U.S. v. Davis (24 MLR 1083), police officers were charged with drug and
other offenses. In order to assure a fair trial the judge initiated a gag order on the parties
involved in the case during the pretrial phases of the case. The media sought twice to
have this restriction removed, claiming that it infringed upon their First Amendment
rights and their right to gather news. Both times the court denied the media, indicating
that the media were not being restricting in any way and that the gag order was necessary
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to insure a fair trial because of the local community’s emotional reaction to the case. In
contrast to this, in a case involving the actions of a school board, the court did find that it
was unconstitutional to restrict the press’ ability to gather news by placing a gag order on
the parties involved in the case (Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 24
MLR 1513). These differences of opinion could be caused by the nature of the cases
themselves or simply because different judges interpret the law differently.
A few judges indicated it was completely reasonable to directly gag the press,
though most did not. Thus, gag orders were rarely granted directly on the press. To get
around this many judges said that it was acceptable to indirectly gag the press by gagging
the parties involved in the case. About half of the judges desiring gag orders on the
parties involved in the case granted them. While their legal reasoning could be debated,
the fact that the gag orders were issued still poses problems that the First Amendment
seeks to eliminate because there could be information being hidden from the public that
should be exposed. On the other hand sometimes the restriction may be needed in order
to assure a fair trial. After a lawyer intentionally lied to the press in an attempt to
prejudice the jury pool in his favor one judge said, “The advocate is still entitled – indeed
encouraged – to strike hard blows, but not unfair blows. Trial practice, whether criminal
or civil is not a contact sport. And its tactics do not include eye-gouging and shinkicking” (U.S. v. Cutler 23 MLR 2089, p. 2100).
What this demonstrates is that the courts are adhering to the precedent set by
Nebraska Press (1976) and Gentile (1991). In Nebraska Press (1976), the court made it
clear that prior restraints imposed upon the press are presumed to be unconstitutional,
though they may be constitutionally permitted if the likelihood of prejudicial publicity is
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very high and imminent. Meanwhile, in Gentile (1991) the court indicated that to impose
a prior restraint on the parties involved in the case there only needs to be a substantial or
reasonable likelihood of prejudicial pretrial publicity. The courts appear to be following
this counsel because only 16% of gag orders sought for the media were actually granted.
In contrast, 45% of the gag orders sought for the parties involved in the case were
granted. Considering that courts needed to only demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of
prejudicial pretrial publicity to impose a gag order on the parties, it is actually surprising
that gag order were not granted more frequently, which likely shows the courts' inherent
dislike of gag orders.
It was also found that gag orders were more likely to be granted in criminal than
in civil trials. This might be because judges think that the fairness of the trial is of greater
importance in criminal cases. It could also be a difference in the reasons behind why the
gag order was sought in the first place because privacy generally is not a strong enough
reason to overcome the presumption against prior restraint.
The results of this study showed that gag orders were more likely to be granted in
the pre-trial stages of a case than during the trial. This could be because judges recognize
that a gag order is more likely to be effective if put into effect sooner. An excellent
example of this is found in U.S. v. Koubriti (32 MLR 1625). In this case the defendant
was charged in connection with the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center.
While awaiting retrial the defendant sought to have the gag order, which had been issued
prior to his original trial, removed because he felt he could get a fairer trial that way. The
judge refused because he felt that the information that would be published would
prejudice potential jurors. The judge went on to say, “Unfortunately, other remedies that
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exist may be tantamount to closing the barn door after the horses are out” (U.S. v
Koubriti 32 MLR 1625, p. 1632).
The two most common proponents of gag orders were judges and defendants,
which is not surprising. What is interesting though, is that judges sought gag orders even
more frequently than defendants and in some cases even sought them against the will of
the defendant, such as in the example discussed above of U.S. v. Koubriti (32 MLR
1625). One possible explanation for this is that judges are more aware of how to make a
trial fair than the other parties involved. It is also possible that judges are afraid of being
accused of negligence in controlling the media surrounding the case, which could lead to
a mistrial or retrial. Thus, in order to avoid a retrial or mistrial they do everything in their
power to demonstrate their efforts to provide a fair trial.
A desire for a fair trial was found to be the most common reason for seeking a gag
order. This seems to make logical sense, given that prior restraints are generally
presumed unconstitutional and gag order proponents must demonstrate a critical need to
overcome that presumption. Some judges have specifically noted that although the First
Amendment was important, it had to yield to the Sixth Amendment and that free press
could be infringed upon, as long as it was done sparingly.
The next most common reason for seeking a gag order was found to be protection
of a minor. This reason is interesting because the gag order associated with the case was
often explicitly sought for privacy reasons and not for a fair trial. For an adult, privacy is
not likely to overcome the presumption against prior restraints, but for juveniles the rules
are different. The courts tended to express a desire for the child’s current and future
well-being, noting that childhood indiscretions or abuse should be kept from the public
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eye in order to allow for a better future for the child. This carries with it some
assumptions, such as that children will change their behavior, whereas adults will not.
Further, there is an assumption that having their history exposed will permanently harm
children, whereas for adults it will not. Whether these assumptions are correct or not is
beyond the current study, but certainly open to debate, both on legal and psychological
grounds. Despite this, in Jeffries v. Mississippi, an appeals court reversed a contempt of
court conviction against a reporter who had published a juvenile’s record. The judge who
reversed the conviction indicated that punishing the free speech rights of the press would
damage a “near sacred right” (Jeffries v. Mississippi, 27 MLR 1413, p. 1415; internal
citation omitted).
Similar arguments occurred with regard to juries, witnesses, and victims. It was
sometimes argued that their privacy was essential to having the judicial system run
properly. It was important for all three groups to know that they could be protected from
harassment, so that future jurors, witnesses, and victims would be willing to participate in
the judicial system.
The most common group challenging gag orders was the news media. Therefore
it makes sense that the most common reason given when challenging a gag order was
freedom of speech. Usually the First Amendment was appealed to in a generic sense, but
on a few occasions a specific concept associated with the First Amendment was used. In
this study those specifically mentioned were the right to gather news and the importance
of shining a light on corruption and falsehood. In The Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette v.
Baker (20 MLR 1434) a woman was in proceedings to end the life support of her father.
The woman sought a gag order to restrain a reporter who had been present in the court
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from publishing any details about the proceedings. The trial court agreed, but the
appellate court overruled the decision and quoted Justice Louis Brandeis, who said that
“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the best policeman”
(Brandeis, 1993, as cited in The Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette v. Baker, 20 MLR 1434, p.
1440). Although the woman’s intention may have been good, it still could have been
important for the community to know of the actions she was planning on taking in the
interest of transparency in the public judicial process.
Overall only about one third of the gag orders sought were granted, but when the
case was a jury trial this number jumped up to about half. It could be that judges know
that jury trials receive greater scrutiny and thus judges feel a greater need to proactively
protect the rights of the defendant. The other side of that coin though, is that by doing so
judges are also protecting themselves from unwanted scrutiny, though likely not
intentionally. Another question to be asked is that if some of the cases that were not
specifically said to be a jury trial had no juries, why were gag orders issued? There
would be no one to protect from potentially biasing media, other than the judge himself,
who in many cases would be exposed to the potentially prejudicing information anyway,
during the discovery portion of the trial. So why issue the gag order?
The difference in how courts treat gag orders can also be seen in the state and
federal outcomes. At the federal level about half the gag orders sought were granted, but
only about a quarter were granted at the state level. Although this could be attributed to
the types of cases that make it to the federal level and the publicity involved, it could also
show a divergence of opinion between types of courts as to the proper use of gag orders.
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Characteristics of Successful Gag Order Requests
The data resulting from this study provided an excellent profile for what courts
generally see as a situation in which a gag order is considered acceptable. It would
appear that courts are most likely to allow a gag order in criminal cases involving a very
serious or heinous crime, which are being argued at the federal level in front of a jury.
Further the gag order is typically requested by the judge in order to provide a fair trial
and sought in the pretrial stages of the case. Lastly, the gag order is narrowly tailored,
directed at the parties involved in the case, and of limited duration.
Characteristics of Unsuccessful Gag Order Requests
In contrast to this, the data also provided an excellent profile for what courts
generally see as situations in which a gag order is not considered acceptable. It would
appear that courts are most likely to deny a gag order in civil cases or lesser crimes,
which are being argued at the state level in front of a judge. Further the gag order is
typically requested by the defendant for privacy reasons and sought during the trial.
Lastly, the gag order is broadly tailored, directed at the media, and of unlimited duration.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to analyze the characteristics of gag orders in an
attempt to better understand how and why gag orders are being used. To accomplish that
this study examined 103 cases from Media Law Reporter and recorded the characteristics
of the cases, including the type of case, the reason for the case, when the gag order was
requested, who requested the gag order, why they requested the gag order, who opposed
the gag order, why they opposed the gag order, and why the gag order was granted or
denied.
The findings reveal that although the issue of gag orders and their use in trials is
not settled, there is a general pattern to how they tend to be used. This study found that
gag orders are most commonly used by judges in serious criminal trials, particularly at
the federal level. Further, the cases usually involved juries and the target of the gag order
was the parties involved in the trial, not the press.
Although this may seem to be common sense, it is important because it means
that gag orders are generally being used appropriately. The U.S. Supreme Court has
indicated that prior restraints are to be presumed unconstitutional, but can be used if an
important need is shown. Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court has labeled prior
restraints against the media as particularly unacceptable, while indicating that prior
restraints on the parties involved in a case are more acceptable. It appears from the
results of this study that judges tend to heed that counsel, allowing gag orders against the
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press only 16% percent of the time, but allowing them 45% of the time when they were
directed at the parties involved in the case.
Study Limitations
There were a few study limitations in relation to the data used. To begin with
Media Law Reporter might exclude some of the relevant cases. Further the cases
included in Media Law Reporter might differ in some way from the cases that were
excluded, which means that the data may be slightly skewed.
Suggestions for Future Research
This study found that the most common reason for seeking a gag order was for a
fair trial, but does a gag order actually help a defendant get a fair trial? This is something
this study cannot answer. Future research could seek to answer this question by
comparing trial outcomes in cases when a gag order had been sought and obtained to
cases when a gag order had been sought and not obtained. A comparison of conviction
rates and sentence lengths could indicate a possible correlation between the use of gag
orders and trial outcomes, or show no impact.
Replicating this study with different cases or studying older cases, including preSheppard, might also shine some light on the reasoning for granting gag orders and
whether this has changed over time.
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Media Law Reporter Classification Guide
I. REGULATION OF MEDIA CONTENT
05. Prior restraints
.01

In General

.02

Authority to restrain

.05

National security restraints

.10

Fair trial restraints

.15

Obscenity restraints

.20

Privacy restraints

.30

Judicial review

.301

– In general

.302

– Standing

.303

– Mootness

.304

– Contempt

08. Fair trial, free press
.01

Restrictive orders in general

.02

Judicial authority

.05

Restrictions solely on broadcast media

.10

Pre-trial restrictions

.11

Trial restrictions

.12

Post-trial restrictions

.20

Alternative protective measures
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Judicial review

.251

– In general

.252

– Standing

.30

Prejudicial publicity as defense
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APPENDIX B
List of Gag Order Cases in Media Law Reporter Volumes 19 to 33
Case
Florida v. Davis

Citation

Year

Court holding/decision

19 MLR 1121 1991 Trial court refused to 'gag' lawyers and law
enforcement, but did admonish them to
follow their professional codes, which they
had broken.

News-Journal
Corp. v. Foxman

19 MLR 1193 1991 U.S. court of appeals upheld the decision of
the District Court to abstain in a deciding
on a 'gag' order.

San Bernardino

19 MLR 1545 1991 Appellate court reversed the trial court's

County v.

'gag' order, but also told them to close the

Superior Court

courtroom.

McClatchy

19 MLR 1555 1991 Appellate court vacated order prohibiting

News. Inc. v.

publication of juvenile’s identity, even if

Fresno County

lawfully obtained.

Superior Court
Wittek v.
Cirigliano

19 MLR 1607 1991 Appellate court found that the media
should be allowed to report the information
it gathered in open court proceedings.

Vermont v.
Schaefer

19 MLR 1905 1991 Appellate court reversed 'gag' order and
unsealed documents despite a trial being
dismissed (mootness).
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McClatchy New. 19 MLR 1871 1992 Appellate court stayed a lower court's order
Inc. v. Stanislaus

to not publish a juvenile's name.

County S. Court
U.S. v. Gotti

19 MLR 1996 1992 Trial court imposed a gag order in the high
profile Gotti case.

Florida v.
Smolka

20 MLR 1058 1992 Judge refused to issue a 'gag' order because
everyone involved was acting responsibly
and therefore there was no need.

Florida v.
Rolling

20 MLR 1127 1992 Court refused to impose a 'gag' order, but
did agree to 90 days temporary closure on
evidence.

Forth Worth

20 MLR 1379 1992 Appellate court reversed restraint on

Star-Telegram v.

publishing a rape victim's identity in the

Walker

paper.

The Fort Wayne

20 MLR 1434 1992 Court acted improperly in restricting a

Journal-Gazette

reporter present at hearing concerning the

v. Baker

withdrawal of life support from reporting it.

Keene Corp. v.
Abate

20 MLR 1609 1992 Plaintiff sought to be able to publish ads in
paper about his side of the issue under trial
and appellate court agreed.

Breiner v. Takao 20 MLR 1762 1992 Appellate court found a lower court's 'gag'
order unfounded.
Corbitt v. NBC

20 MLR 2037 1992 Plaintiff tried to restrain NBC from
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broadcasting a show about his case, but
was denied.
U.S. v. Salameh

21 MLR 1376 1993 Order barring counsel from speaking to
press is vacated.

In re H.N.

21 MLR 2318 1993 An order restricting a newspaper from
publishing the identity of a juvenile was
reversed.

U.S. v. Rahman

22 MLR 1063 1993 Court refuses to allow a writer access to
discovery materials.

Austin Daily
Herald v. Mork

22 MLR 1442 1993 Court upheld order that allowed media into
juvenile hearing, but on the condition that
they not publish information about the
juveniles present.

Florida v. Lopez

22 MLR 1574 1993 Court will allow media to broadcast an
interview containing a defendant’s
confession to the crime.

Lesher Com.
Inc. v. Alameda

22 MLR 1383 1994 Court allowed a newspaper to print the
name of a juvenile.

County S. Court
U.S. v. Rahman

22 MLR 1407 1994 Court again refuses to allow media access
to discovery materials despite a leak.

Times Pub. Co.
v. Florida

22 MLR 1410 1994 Court allowed publication of information
and pictures of jurors.

Gag Order Requests
Menendez v.
Fox

69

22 MLR 1702 1994 Court allows Fox to broadcast a docudrama
about a murder case.

Ohio v. Barker

22 MLR 1908 1994 Court refused to impose a 'gag' order.

Florida v.

23 MLR 1061 1994 Defendant sought to have attorney's office

Richardson
Jacksonville TV
Inc. v. Florida
KGTV Channel

'gagged' and press restrained.
23 MLR 1254 1994 Appellate court quashed order to obscure
face of an interviewee.
23 MLR 1303 1994 Appellate court ruled that the media can

10 v. San Diego

publish the identity of a minor because it

County S. Court

was obtained lawfully.

Kansas v. Alston 23 MLR 1321 1994 Court reverses contempt conviction of a
newspaper.
West Virginia ex 23 MLR 1569 1994 Appellate court allowed the publication of
rel. The

information about a minor because it was

Register-Herald

lawfully obtained.

v. Canterbury
Ohio ex rel New
World Com. v.

23 MLR 1478 1995 Appellate court removes a gag on the
media because of lack of reason for it.

Character
U.S. v. Cutler

23 MLR 2089 1995 John Gotti's lawyer contended his criminal
contempt conviction for speaking to press
violated First Amendment, but conviction
was affirmed on basis of Gentile.
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24 MLR 1054 1995 Media sought to have a partial gag order
removed from parties and lawyers, but
were denied.

In Re Minor
Charged

24 MLR 1057 1995 Trial judge ordered no one, especially the
media, to identify or publish the identity or
photograph of a juvenile on trial.

In Re Minor
Charged

24 MLR 1064 1995 Appellate court vacated order prohibiting
publication of juvenile’s identity or
photograph.

U.S. v. Davis

24 MLR 1083 1995 Media again sought to have a partial gag
order removed from parties and lawyers,
but were denied.

Rockdale

24 MLR 1120 1995 Appellate court remanded a decision to

Citizen Pub. Co.

impose a gag order on trial participants and

v. Georgia

to exclude the media from the trial.

Florida v.
Ciambrone

24 MLR 1891 1995 Judge will not 'gag' the trial participants or
seal documents.

Davis v. E.Baton 24 MLR 1513 1996 Appellate court vacated an order that
Rouge Parish

'gagged' school board members from

School Board

discussing desegregation plan.

U.S. v. McVeigh 24 MLR 1908 1996 During the trial of Timothy McVeigh the
judge ordered all counsel (and support
personnel) gagged.
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24 MLR 2172 1996 Appellate court reversed a decision by a
trial judge to ban the publishing a
prosecution witness' name.

Rufo v. Simpson 24 MLR 2213 1996 Media and plaintiff seek to have gag order
removed, instead it is modified (more
specific).
News Herald v.
Ruyle
California v.
Rollins

24 MLR 2436 1996 Federal district court stayed a state court
order gagging media.
24 MLR 2569 1996 Judge restricted media access and gag
ordered witnesses, lawyers, and court
personnel until jury selection and
evidentiary hearing is completed.

In Re Inquiry of
Broadbelt

25 MLR 1074 1996 A judge who was appearing frequently on
Court TV and Geraldo to comment on
pending cases was reprimanded for doing
so.

Montana ex rel.

25 MLR 1577 1997 A judge ordered documents sealed and all

The Missoulian

participants to not talk with the media in a

v. Montana

criminal trial. The appellate court reversed

Twenty-first

the sealed documents restriction and

Judicial District

ordered the lower court to reconsider the

Court

gag order's appropriateness.

Zamora v.

25 MLR 1638 1997 A criminal defendant sought to prevent a

Gag Order Requests
Adams

72

TV movie depicting her case to be aired,
but was denied.

In Re Petitions

25 MLR 1697 1997 Trial of Timothy McVeigh was restricted

of Colorado-

by an order prohibiting out of court

Oklahoma

comments by participants. Order was

Media Reps.

affirmed.

U.S. v.
Cleveland

25 MLR 2500 1997 After a criminal trial a judge told jurors not
interview with the press about their
deliberations and this order was affirmed
by the appellate court.

South Bend

26 MLR 1694 1998 Media sought to quash a gag order imposed

Tribune v.

on the parties involved in a case, but were

Elkhart C. Court

denied.

In Re

26 MLR 2183 1998 Appellate court reversed a decision to

Hattiesburg

impose a gag order on the parties and their

American

lawyers.

Sheehan v. King
County

26 MLR 2340 1998 Plaintiff sought to have defendant
restrained from publishing defamatory
material on his website, but was denied.

Ex Parte State

27 MLR 1193 1998 A recording between a defendant and his

Record Co

lawyer by the police was leaked to a news

(State of S.

station, who were ordered not to broadcast

Carolina v.

it. Order was upheld.
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Quattlebaum)
George W.

27 MLR 1348 1998 Trial judge had ordered media not to

Prescott Pub. v.

publish certain information about juveniles

Stoughton Div.

in criminal action but order vacated on

of D. Court

appeal.

Jeffries v.
Mississippi

27 MLR 1413 1998 Reporter held in contempt for publishing
details of a juvenile's record, but the
conviction of reporter was reversed.

Sherrill v.

27 MLR 2334 1998 Parties and lawyers were forbidden to

Amerada Hess

speak to the media until trial was

Corp.

concluded, but the appeal court reversed
the order.

State v. Blom

27 MLR 2402 1999 Defendant's lawyer sought gag order and
judge denied it.

People v. Baqleh 28 MLR 2372 1999 Judge refused a request for a gag; all
parties requested it and therefore can of
themselves not speak to the press. Court
applied Levine and Gentile but did not find
a substantial likelihood.
State v. Parks

28 MLR 1318 2000 Judge refused a request for a gag order on
news media in criminal case because the
request was overbroad.

Dow Jones v.

28 MLR 1737 2000 A judge had banned all parties from talking
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to the news about class action case against
tobacco companies, but federal court told
him to remove the gag order.

Sioux Falls
Argus Leader v.

28 MLR 1833 2000 Media sought to have a gag order removed
from all parties, but were denied.

Miller
United States v.
King

28 MLR 2057 2000 Judge refused to block the airing of an
interview with a witness in an upcoming
trial, but did order all witnesses to refrain
from interviews in the future.

Arkansas Dem.-

28 MLR 2321 2000 Gag order on news pix of juvenile reversed

Gazette v.

because court proceedings had already been

Zimmerman

held in open.

South Coast

29 MLR 1119 2000 California appellate panel holds that

Newspapers Inc.

Superior Court judge improperly entered

v. Superior

order prohibiting publication of legally

Court

obtained photograph of juvenile criminal
defendant.

Hurvitz v.
Hoefflin

29 MLR 1215 2000 California appellate court holds that trial
judge erred in issuing gag order with
respect to information about misconduct by
a doctor.

People v. Xiong

29 MLR 1255 2000 Trial judge vacated his previous order
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gagging law enforcement and prosecution;
reasons not given.
Devine v.
Robinson

29 MLR 1301 2001 Federal trial judge holds that Illinois
attorney disciplinary system (under
direction of state supreme court) was
entitled to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on
prosecutors' claims that Rules 3.6 and 3.8
violated First Amendment rights.

Corrigan v.
White

29 MLR 1636 2001 On remand from NC Court of Appeals, trial
court vacated gag order against parties in
connection with civil lawsuit alleging
liability for sexual assaults.

Cape Pub. Inc.
v. Braden

29 MLR 1653 2001 Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed
intermediate appellate court decision that
trial judge had erred in attempting to
enforce a post-trial order banning media
contact with jurors.

United States v.
Brown

29 MLR 1779 2001 Fifth Circuit upheld district court's use of
anonymous jury in trial of former
Louisiana governor, but Fifth Circuit
reversed a non-circumvention orders as
unconstitutional gag order under Nebraska
Press.
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29 MLR 1954 2001 NY trial judge held that there was no basis
for entry of a gag order on parties in a
divorce case where party seeking order was
high-profile NY public official.

People v. Garcia

29 MLR 2083 2001 Trial judge denies criminal defendant's
motion for temporary restraining order
against NBC “Law and Order” broadcast
that was similar to case involving
defendant.

Dow Jones v.
Kaye

29 MLR 2107 2001 Federal appeal by state judge moot because
state trial concluded; but, federal district
court preliminary injunction against state
judge is vacated.

People v.
Ackerman

29 MLR 2113 2001 Michigan appellate court affirmed a trial
court's decision to deny journalists' motion
to vacate an order prohibiting photographs
of jurors after high-profile criminal trial.
Photographers were arrested and their film
confiscated.

HBE Corp v.
NAACP

29 MLR 2249 2001 Defamation plaintiffs sought broad
preliminary injunction banning statements
by defendants, but sought-after order would
restrict too much speech.
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29 MLR 2254 2001 Trial judge imposed oral gag order on
attorneys from talking about prospect of
motion that had not been filed yet; Third
Circuit said there was no issue of
prejudicing jury and trial judge's only
concern was having control over motion.

State v. Cohen

29 MLR 2590 2001 Denied motion for gag order because not
much publicity.

Albuquerque
Journal v. Jewell

29 MLR 1558 2001 NM Sup Ct dissolved juvenile court gag
order on all parties in child abuse case
because parents of child had changed their
minds and no longer wanted gag order in
place. Order excluding public and media
access to courtroom, however, was
affirmed.

Skakel v. Skakel

30 MLR 2374 2001 Trial court holds that there is no
justification for gag order on parties in
divorce case involving Michael Skakel,
who faced murder charge in unrelated case.

State v. Marsh

30 MLR 1505 2002 Georgia trial judge imposes extremely
broad and detailed gag order on trial
participants.

State v. Marsh

30 MLR 1507 2002 Georgia trial judge slightly modifies gag
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order imposed previously to clarify it does
not prohibit police from giving information
to family about bodies of relatives or
officials from giving public safety, health
and environmental information.
United States v.
Gray

30 MLR 1542 2002 Federal trial judge holds that broad gag
order (seeking silencing of attorney not
connected to case but yes connected to
related state court case) is not warranted,
but judge grants limited gag order silencing
parties and lawyers to case at hand.

County Security

30 MLR 1929 2002 Sixth Circuit dissolves injunction

Agency v. Ohio

prohibiting freelance journalist from

Dept Commerce

disclosing information about private
security guards in labor dispute.

State v.
Neulander

30 MLR 2281 2002 NJ Supreme Court holds that media may
not conduct post-trial interviews with
members of hung jury in case of Jewish
rabbi charged with murder his wife;
primary reason is that case will be retried
and allowing interviews would give
advantage to prosecutors.

Los Angeles

30 MLR 2343 2002 California appellate court holds that trial
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lawfully in court, even though court later
rescinded its permission to photograph.
State v. Evans

31 MLR 1346 2002 Florida trial judge concludes that gag order
not necessary in high-profile murder case;
even without gag order, lawyers and police
are already forbidden from making
statements that would prejudice case.

State v.
Edmonds

31 MLR 1580 2002 Florida trial judge concludes that gag order
not necessary in high-profile child
molestation case, but judge does seal
certain evidence in case.

Jackson v.
Jackson
Atlanta Journal-

31 MLR 2404 2002 Illinois court denies motion for gag order
on parties and lawyers.
32 MLR 1424 2004 All court participants in a trial were ordered

Constitution v.

to tell the media “no comment” or “we'll

State

talk at trial,” but it was reversed when
appealed because the court failed to
demonstrate a substantial need.

City of

32 MLR 1609 2004 The News Post sought access to a 'black

Frederick v.

book' of someone convicting of

Randall Family

prostitution, previous restriction on only
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publishing city officials or public figures
names was struck down.
United States v.
Koubriti

32 MLR 1625 2004 Defendants in a terrorism case under
consideration for retrial sought to have a
gag order on the case removed, but were
denied.

State v.
Durousseau

32 MLR 1701 2004 Defendant in a serial murder trial wished
for media to be denied access to trial
information, but was denied.

U.S. v. Scrushy

32 MLR 1814 2004 Federal district court granted joint motion
by prosecution and defense (in criminal
case of former CEO) that restricted
extrajudicial statements.

People v. Bryant

32 MLR 1961 2004 Colorado Supreme Court upholds order
prohibiting news media from publishing
details of in camera transcripts regarding
sexual history and clothing of Kobe Bryant
accuser.

Associated Press 32 MLR 2089 2004 Justice Stephen Breyer, Circuit Justice,
v. District Court

denies application by media to stay orders
of Colorado courts banning publication of
contents of transcripts of in camera
hearings in Kobe Bryant case.
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McPeters
San Jose

32 MLR 2279 2004 Defendants desire for a 'gag order' on the
media shows no necessity and is denied.
32 MLR 2322 2004 California appellate court holds that

Mercury News

instruction to grand jury witnesses to

v. Criminal

remain quiet not First Amendment

Grand Jury

violation.

Bush v. Diocese
of Peoria
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32 MLR 2468 2004 Catholic Priest accused of sexually
assaulting two young girls in the '60s is
suing them for defamation and wished to
reveal their names, but was not allowed to.

U.S. v. Gotti

33 MLR 1083 2004 Gotti sought to have a witness who
happened to host a talk show gagged, but
was denied.

Hobley v. Burge

33 MLR 1195 2004 Non-party deponents' motion to have media
restricted from broadcasting clips of pretrial depositions was granted.

State v. Barber

33 MLR 1564 2004 Trial judge ordered a sealed document that
was leaked resealed and for no one to
publish it.

Doe v. New
York University

33 MLR 1755 2004 Sex assault victims not entitled to order
prohibiting campus paper from publishing
names because names were lawfully
obtained.
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U.S. v.
Quattrone

33 MLR 1423 2005 A court's 'gag' order was found to be
unconstitutional upon appeal.
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